

Modified Proper Names and the Structure of D_e

Though much work has been given to defining the exact nature of the proper name, most semantic theories assume some atomic element in the domain D_e corresponding to the unique referent of the name (cf. Matushansky, 2008; Izumi, 2013). However, the ability of proper names to be modified restrictively, as with *drunk Joan* in (1) or *the Jewish Saul* in (2) shows that further division of this atomic individual is possible. Whereas previous accounts for these modified proper names (MPNs) have relied on spatiotemporal divisions (Paul, 1994), I introduce a new subclass of examples using inherent properties that suggest that a more complex notion of the individual is necessary.

In a model with individuals as atomic elements of the domain, MPNs are problematic on both compositional and truth-conditional counts. Focusing on the latter issue, a given property may hold of a proper name (1a), but not its modified form (1b).

- (1) a. **Joan** is quite reserved.
- b. But **drunk Joan** is very outgoing.

The lack of a contradiction between (1a) and (1b) should not be possible if the *Joan* of both sentences points to the same individual in the domain. Paul (1994) accounts for this by broadening the domain of individuals to include spatiotemporal slices of individuals which can be grouped as pluralities (conceptually similar though not necessarily identical to Carlson's (1977) object-stage division). $[\mathbf{Joan}]$ is then the full set of spatiotemporal Joan-slices, while $[\mathbf{Drunk Joan}]$ denotes the maximal set of Joan-slices for which the property *drunk* holds.

This solution handles well examples such as (1), but I argue that it is incomplete. In examples where the restriction on the proper name is not temporally anchored, spatiotemporal slices do not address the apparent (lack of) contradiction.

- (2) It's funny but **the Jewish Saul** finds it easier to connect and feel a part than **the gay Saul**.
- (3) **The Chinese me** tells me this education offers opportunities, while **the American me** tells me I should quit school and start working.

Inherent properties such as *Jewish* and *gay* are contemporaneous; any time slice where one holds, so too does the other. I propose that to account for these cases, we must further enrich the domain such that the smallest element in D_e is not an individual at a given time, but rather a psychologically-coherent fragment, or *persona* at a given time. This enables restriction to foreground inherent properties such as those in (2-3). In addition, the system further emphasizes previously remarked-upon (Carlson, 1977) similarities between proper names

and kinds, emerging from its parallel treatment of the relationship between kind-denoting bare plurals and their comprising objects, and object-denoting bare proper names and their comprising personas.

References

- Carlson, G. N. (1977). A unified analysis of the english bare plural. *Linguistics and philosophy*, 1(3):413–457.
- Izumi, Y. (2013). *The Semantics of Proper Names and other Bare Nominals*. PhD thesis, University of Maryland, College Park.
- Matushansky, O. (2008). On the linguistic complexity of proper names. *Linguistics and Philosophy*, 31(5):573–627.
- Paul, M. (1994). Young mozart and the joking woody allen: Proper names, individuals and parts. In *Proceedings of SALT*, volume 4, pages 268–281.