Modified Proper Names and the Structure of $D_e$

Though much work has been given to defining the exact nature of the proper name, most semantic theories assume some atomic element in the domain $D_e$ corresponding to the unique referent of the name (cf. Matushansky, 2008; Izumi, 2013). However, the ability of proper names to be modified restrictively, as with drunk Joan in (1) or the Jewish Saul in (2) shows that further division of this atomic individual is possible. Whereas previous accounts for these modified proper names (MPNs) have relied on spatiotemporal divisions (Paul, 1994), I introduce a new subclass of examples using inherent properties that suggest that a more complex notion of the individual is necessary.

In a model with individuals as atomic elements of the domain, MPNs are problematic on both compositional and truth-conditional counts. Focusing on the latter issue, a given property may hold of a proper name (1a), but not its modified form (1b).

(1) a. Joan is quite reserved.
   b. But drunk Joan is very outgoing.

The lack of a contradiction between (1a) and (1b) should not be possible if the Joan of both sentences points to the same individual in the domain. Paul (1994) accounts for this by broadening the domain of individuals to include spatiotemporal slices of individuals which can be grouped as pluralities (conceptually similar though not necessarily identical to Carlson’s (1977) object-stage division). [Joan] is then the full set of spatiotemporal Joan-slices, while [Drunk Joan] denotes the maximal set of Joan-slices for which the property drunk holds.

This solution handles well examples such as (1), but I argue that it is incomplete. In examples where the restriction on the proper name is not temporally anchored, spatiotemporal slices do not address the apparent (lack of) contradiction.

(2) It’s funny but the Jewish Saul finds it easier to connect and feel a part than the gay Saul.

(3) The Chinese me tells me this education offers opportunities, while the American me tells me I should quit school and start working.

Inherent properties such as Jewish and gay are contemporaneous; any time slice where one holds, so too does the other. I propose that to account for these cases, we must further enrich the domain such that the smallest element in $D_e$ is not an individual at a given time, but rather a psychologically-coherent fragment, or persona at a given time. This enables restriction to foreground inherent properties such as those in (2-3). In addition, the system further emphasizes previously remarked-upon (Carlson, 1977) similarities between proper names.
and kinds, emerging from its parallel treatment of the relationship between kind-denoting bare plurals and their comprising objects, and object-denoting bare proper names and their comprising personas.

References


